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The	Emerging	Global	Right	to	Investment:	Understanding	the	
reasoning	behind	foreign	investor	rights	Nicolás	M	Perrone*	Abstract	The	international	investment	regime	is	probably	the	most	controversial	area	of	international	law	today.	This	article	argues	that	looking	at	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	can	help	us	to	better	understand	this	regime	and	the	challenges	it	poses	to	states	and	local	actors.	Relying	on	property	and	contract	law	theory,	this	article	shows	that	the	arbitral	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	privileges	wealth	maximization	over	propriety.	This	leads	arbitrators	to	draw	on	particular	theories	of	property	and	contractual	reliance.	The	analysis	of	these	interpretative	moves	brings	to	the	front	crucial	normative	and	distributive	implications	of	the	international	investment	regime.	
	
Introduction		What	do	we	protect	when	we	protect	foreign	investment?	This	may	seem	a	trivial	question,	but	it	is	not.	The	literature	on	the	international	investment	regime	has	touched	on	this	question	in	passing	when	discussing	the	applicable	law	or	the	nature	of	foreign	investor	rights	(i.e.	whether	foreign	investors	own	the	rights	or	are	only	beneficiaries).	But	it	has	never	explored	the	object	of	investment	protection	in	detail.	For	most	of	the	literature,	this	does	not	seem	to	be	an	important	question.	International	investment	law	is	based	on	the	premise	that	investment	treaties	and	arbitration	are	mechanisms	to	protect	rights	that	are	well	defined	either	in	investment	contracts	or	in	the	domestic	legislation.	The	concern	of	this	field,	in	other	words,	is	not	the	indeterminacy	of	foreign	investor	rights.	The	international	investment	regime	is	about	political	risk	and	pacta	sunt	servanda.1	Foreign	investors	acquire	control	rights	over	assets	such	as	land	and	minerals,	but	these	rights	remain	at	the	mercy	of	host	states’	sovereign	powers.	The	
raison	d'être	of	investment	arbitration	is	to	protect	foreign	investor	rights	against	the	abusive	or	arbitrary	use	of	these	powers.	For	Wälde,	investment	
																																								 																				*	Assistant	Professor	in	International	Law,	Durham	Law	School.	I	would	like	to	thank	Jorge	Esquirol,	René	Urueña,	John	Haskell,	Tomaso	Ferrando,	Markus	Wagner	and	Andrew	Lang	1	W	Reisman,	‘‘Case	Specific	Mandates’	versus	‘Systemic	Implications’:	How	Should	Investment	Tribunals	Decide?,’	29	Arbitration	International	(2013)	131,	151;	J	Paulsson,	‘The	power	of	states	to	make	meaningful	promises	to	foreigners,’	1:2	Journal	of	
International	Dispute	Settlement	(2010)	341;	J	Salacuse,	‘The	Emerging	Global	Regime	for	Investment,’	51	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	(2010)	427.		
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arbitration	is	at	the	core	of	this	regime	because	‘[a]	right	without	an	effective	remedy	is	a	mere	declaration.’2		 But	the	premise	that	investment	arbitration	is	only	a	remedy	to	protect	well-defined	foreign	investor	rights	is	flawed.	Legal	orders	do	not	define	entitlements	in	a	comprehensive	and	detailed	manner.	Property	is	the	result	of	a	‘system	of	pre-established	rights,	which	are	disputable	or	even	disputed.’3	There	is	no	universal	concept	of	property	but	rather	different	conceptions	that	depend	on	normative	and	policy	preferences.	The	interpretation	of	property	‘is	informed	both	by	background	conceptions	about	economics,	public	and	private	authority,	the	nature	of	property	and	by	ideas	about	what	law	itself	is	and	how	it	works,	all	of	which	differ	from	time	to	time	and	place	to	place.’4	Contracts	can	mitigate	this	problem,	but	only	to	certain	extent.	Foreign	investors	can	rely	on	contracts	to	clarify	the	scope	of	ownership,	creating	special	entitlements	in	areas	like	taxation	or	environmental	requirements.5	But	contracts	remain	incomplete	by	definition.6	Contractual	entitlements	are	not	always	enough	to	resolve	investment	disputes,	and	many	investments,	in	any	case,	are	not	the	result	of	detailed	investment	contracts.		 Property	and	contracts	are	subject	to	interpretation,	and	this	interpretation	has	significant	normative	and	distributional	effects.7	The	literature	recognizes	the	limitations	that	investment	protection	standards	may	impose	on	state	regulation.	These	intrusive	effects,	however,	can	be	more	severe	if	we	accept	that	investment	tribunals	participate	in	the	process	of	defining	foreign	investor	rights.	For	one,	the	concepts	of	property	and	sovereignty	are	closely	interconnected.8	Greater	foreign	investor	rights	limit	states’	sovereign	power	to	implement	reforms	without	paying	compensation.	For	another,	the	definition	of	property	affects	all,	including	those	who	are	not	parties	to	the	contracts	clarifying	the	scope	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Property	is	relational	and	regulation	is	not	only	about	
																																								 																				2	T	Wälde,	‘The	Specific	Nature	of	Investment	Arbitration,’	in	P	Kahn	&	T	Wälde	(eds.)	Les	
Aspects	Nouveaux	du	Droit	des	Investissements	Internationaux/New	Aspects	Of	International	
Investment	Law	(Nijhoff	,	2007)	43,	119.	3	C	Barrère,	‘Judicial	System	and	Property	Rights’,	in	E	Colombatto	(ed.)	The	Elgar	
Companion	to	the	Economics	of	Property	Rights	(Edward	Elgar	Pub,	2006)	129,	151.	4	David	Kennedy,	‘Some	Caution	About	Property	Rights	as	a	Recipe	for	Economic	Development,’	1:1	Accounting,	Economics,	and	Law	(2011)	3,	13.	5	T	Anderson	&	P	Hill,	‘The	Evolution	of		Property	Rights,’	in	T	Anderson	&	F	McChesney	(eds.),	Property	rights:	cooperation,	conflict,	and	law	(Princeton	UP,	2003)	118,	122-3.	6	E	Brousseau	&	J	Glachant,	‘The	Economics	of	Contracts	and	The	Renewal	of	Economics’	in	E	Brousseau	&	J	Glachant	(eds.)	The	Economics	of	Contracts-Theories	and	Applications	(Cambridge	UP,	2002)	3.				7	Kennedy,	supra	note	4;	H	Muir	Watt,	“Private	international	law	beyond	the	schism,”	2:3	
Transnational	legal	theory	2.3	(2011)	347,	352.	8	M	Cohen,	‘Property	and	Sovereignty,’	13	Cornell	Law	Quarterly	(1927-1928)	8.		
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curbing	negative	externalities	but	also	about	protecting	neighboring	property	rights.9	The	problem	of	indeterminacy	is	not	new	to	international	investment	law.	The	vagueness	and	ambiguity	of	the	standards	of	investment	protection,	such	as	indirect	expropriation	and	fair	and	equitable	treatment	(FET),	has	dominated	investment	law	literature	since	the	early	2000s.	Most	academic	and	policy	work	has	aimed	to	deal	with	this	issue	in	one	way	or	another.	Some	reform	proposals	have	suggested	tackling	indeterminacy	and	inconsistent	awards	through	the	creation	of	an	appeal	mechanism	or,	more	recently,	a	permanent	investment	court.10	Others	have	looked	at	different	methods	to	improve	the	arbitral	interpretation	of	the	relevant	treaties.	Global	administrative	law	and	comparative	public	law	have	been	very	popular	in	this	respect.11	The	masters	of	the	treaties,	i.e.	the	states,	have	also	attempted	to	reinterpret	or	renegotiate	the	treaties.12	This	article	looks	at	the	problem	of	indeterminacy	from	a	slightly	different	angle.	Focusing	on	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights,	I	propose	to	examine	the	baseline,	i.e.	the	measure	of	property	and	contracts,	against	which	arbitrators	review	state	behavior.	This	is	linked	to	the	interpretation	of	investment	treaties	even	if	these	treaties	–as	most	constitutional	property	clauses–	provide	few	insights	about	the	interpretation	of	property	and	contractual	rights.13	Investment	treaties	as	constitutional	property	clauses	provide	rights	and	remedies.	Concerning	remedies,	as	Cotula	observes,	investment	treaties	grant	foreign	investors	with	an	efficient	means	to	enforce	their	rights	when	compared,	for	instance,	with	locals	who	can	only	rely	on	domestic	law	or	human	rights	systems.14	But	investment	treaties,	as	constitutions,	provide	more	than	a	remedy.	As	Llewellyn	explains,	‘[n]ot	only	‘no	remedy	no	right,’	but	‘precisely	as	much	right	as	remedy.’15	Investment	arbitrators	need	to	interpret	foreign	investor	rights,	and	this	necessarily	entails	defining	correlative	obligations	of	non-interference	on	states	and	other	local	actors.		
																																								 																				9	G	Alexander	&	E	Peñalver.	An	introduction	to	property	theory	(Cambridge	UP,	2012)	169.	10	See	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	(UNCTAD),	‘Reform	of	Investor-State	Dispute	Settlement:	In	Search	of	a	Roadmap’,	IIA	Issues	Note	No.	2	(June	2013).	11	See	S	Schill,	‘The	Sixth	Path:	Reforming	Investment	Law	from	Within’,	11:1	TDM	(January	2014).	12	A	Roberts,	‘Power	and	persuasion	in	investment	treaty	interpretation:	the	dual	role	of	states,’	104:2	American	Journal	of	International	Law	(2010)	179.	13	See	F	Michelman,	‘Property	as	a	Constitutional	Right’,	38	Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	(1981)	1097,	1098-9.	14	L	Cotula,	Human	rights,	natural	resource	and	investment	law	in	a	globalised	world:	shades	
of	grey	in	the	shadow	of	the	law	(Routledge,	2012).	15	K	Llewellyn,	Jurisprudence:	Realism	in	Theory	and	Practice	(Transaction	Publishers	2000)	63;	D	Levinson,	“Rights	Essentialism	and	Remedial	Equilibration,”	99:4	Columbia	Law	
Review	(1999)	857,	858.	
Final	Draft	–	Forthcoming	in	the	Journal	of	International	Dispute	Settlement	
	 4	
Against	this	background,	this	article	has	two	objectives.	The	first	is	to	show	that	international	investment	arbitration	is	more	than	a	remedy	to	foreign	investor	rights.	Investment	tribunals	not	only	review	host	state	measures	to	protect	foreign	investors	from	abusive	and	arbitrary	behavior.	They	also	specify	the	scope	of	foreign	investor	rights	relying	on	either	domestic	or	international	law.	This	article	focuses	on	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	according	to	the	legitimate	expectations	doctrine	and	international	law	(i.e.	investment-as-expectations).	The	second	objective	is	to	examine	this	interpretation	using	property	and	contract	theory.	My	argument	is	that	arbitrators	follow	a	Lockean	conception	of	property	where	foreign	investor	rights	emerge	as	the	outcome	of	transactions	between	foreign	investors	and	host	states.	The	primary,	if	not	the	only,	purpose	of	these	transactions	is	the	maximization	of	local	wealth	through	foreign	investment.	This	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights	falls	under	the	label	of	investment	rights.	As	opposed	to	other	types	of	property,	Veblen	describes	investment	rights	as	a	form	of	absent	or	passive	ownership	with	the	aim	to	maximize	wealth.16	In	this	respect,	Veblen’s	conception	is	different	from	other	utilitarian	conceptions	of	property	because	in	his	view	the	owner	is,	in	some	way,	detached	from	the	relational	consequences	brought	about	by	the	investments.		Foreign	investors	have	a	similar	relationship	with	host	resources	and	societies	because,	as	opposed	to	migrants,	they	never	fully	integrate	into	these	societies.	They	remain,	in	many	respects,	absent.	This	could	lead,	following	the	work	of	Waldron,	to	an	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	that	reproduces	‘the	perspective	of	an	outsider	interested	only	[...]	in	what	can	be	extracted	from	a	given	society.’17	The	first	section	of	this	article	shows	that	investment	tribunals	play	a	major	role	in	specifying	the	scope	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Arbitrators	need	to	interpret	these	rights	in	order	to	resolve	investment	disputes.	In	so	doing,	they	can	apply	either	domestic	or	international	law.	The	second	section	examines	the	normative	theory	behind	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	according	to	international	law.	It	relies	on	the	work	of	Rose,	Alexander,	and	Waldron	to	argue	that	the	purpose	of	these	rights	is	the	maximization	of	wealth.	The	third	section	suggests	that	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	is	the	result	of	this	purpose	and	a	transactional	view	of	foreign	investment	relations.	According	to	this	conception,	what	matters	most	are	the	views	of	the	promisees,	i.e.	foreign	investors,	and	not	those	of	the	promisors,	i.e.	host	states	and	local	actors.	The	fourth	section	relies	on	this	claim	to	argue	that	this	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	
																																								 																				16	T	Veblen,	‘The	Natural	Right	of	Investment’,	in	C	B	Macpherson	(ed.),	Property,	
Mainstream	and	Critical	Positions	(University	of	Toronto	Press,	1978)	121.	17	J	Waldron,	The	Rule	of	Law	and	the	Measure	of	Property	(Cambridge	UP,	2012)	105-6.	
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overlooks	crucial	normative	and	distributional	effects.	This	article	concludes	by	suggesting	that	a	more	pluralist	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	is	possible,	one	that	could	accommodate	competing	expectations	for	local	resources.			
1.	Investment	tribunals	and	foreign	investor	rights		For	many	years,	the	literature	on	international	investment	law	has	discussed	the	private	or	public	law	nature	of	this	international	regime.18	A	public	law	approach	focuses	on	judicial	review,	global	administrative	law,	and	is	sometimes	perceived	as	a	more	progressive	understanding	of	the	international	investment	regime.	This	approach	focuses	on	the	indeterminate	nature	of	the	standards	of	protection,	proposing	for	instance	the	use	of	proportionality	as	an	interpretative	method	that	could	help	safeguard	states’	regulatory	space.19	A	private	law	approach	to	the	international	investment	regime,	on	the	other	hand,	is	often	described	in	rather	doctrinal	terms.	It	draws	on	principles	such	as	pacta	sunt	servanda	and	is	regarded	as	less	progressive.	Those	who	highlight	the	private	dimension	of	this	regime,	like	Douglas	or	Alvarez,	prefer	to	describe	international	investment	law	as	a	hybrid	regime.20			 According	to	property	law	theory,	this	hybrid	view	is	theoretically	sound	because	property	is	an	artifact	of	public	and	private	law.21	But	what	follows	from	this,	even	if	often	overlooked,	is	that	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	should	be	at	the	center	of	any	private	law	discussion	of	the	international	investment	regime.	Most	economic	and	political	economy	analyses	of	foreign	investment	confirm	this	central	role	of	property	and	contract	rights.	These	analyses	show	that	foreign	investors	have	a	strong	interest	in	creating,	strengthening,	and	protecting	their	ownership	advantages.22	And	one	could	argue	that	international	law	has	not	been	indifferent	to	this	interest.	The	promotion	of	a	minimum	standard	of	treatment	for	foreign	property	goes	to	the	core	of	international	law,23	and	
																																								 																				18	J	Alvarez,	‘Is	Investor-State	Arbitration	‘Public’?,’	7:3	Journal	of	International	Dispute	
Settlement	(2016)	534.	A	fundamental	contribution	in	this	debate	is	G	Van	Harten,	
Investment	Treaty	Arbitration	And	Public	Law	(Oxford	UP,	2007).		19	See	S	Schill	(ed.),	International	investment	law	and	comparative	public	law	(Oxford	UP,	2010).	20	J	Alvarez,	supra	note	20;	Z	Douglas,	‘The	Hybrid	Foundations	of	Investment	Treaty	Arbitration,’	74	British	Yearbook	of	International	Law	(2003)	151.	21	J	Waldron,	supra	note	19,	32-3.	22	Most	recent	studies	of	foreign	investment	decisions	rely	on	a	property	rights	approach.	See	E	Helpman,	Understanding	global	trade	(Harvard	UP,	2011)	154-5.	23	C	Lipson,	Standing	Guard:	Protecting	Foreign	Capital	In	The	Nineteenth	And	Twentieth	
Centuries	(University	of	California	Press,	1985);	Jacob	Viner,	International	Economics:	
studies	(Free	Press,	1951)	218.	
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has	been	a	major	justification	for	the	international	investment	regime	since	the	1950s.24		Investment	law	literature,	however,	suggests	that	arbitrators’	main	task	is	to	enforce	investment	treaty	standards	and	foreign	investor	rights.	McLachlan	and	Douglas	have	claimed	that	this	regime	is	necessary	to	enforce,	and	not	to	expand,	these	rights.25	Douglas	is	probably	the	author	who	has	dedicated	more	time	to	examining	foreign	investor	rights.	His	view	is	that	investment	tribunals	should	rely	on	conflict	of	law	rules	to	decide	the	applicable	law.	These	rules	would	normally	lead	the	tribunal	to	host	state	law,	resolving	any	dispute	related	to	foreign	investor	rights.26	More	recently,	Douglas	has	noted	that	there	is	‘another	source	of	expectations	relating	to	property	that	do	not	overlap	precisely	with	legal	entitlements	created	by	the	law	of	property.’27	But	even	acknowledging	that	international	law	may	be	a	source	of	expectations	does	not	solve	the	problem.	As	Alexander	claims	in	his	book	on	global	constitutional	property,	the	interpretation	of	these	sources	and	the	emerging	rights	remains	the	central	issue.28		Investment	tribunals	often	rely	on	international	law	to	specify	the	scope	of	foreign	investor	rights.	In	Metalclad	v.	Mexico	and	Tecmed	v.	Mexico,	the	arbitrators	relied	on	legitimate	expectations	and	international	law	to	find	that	Mexico	had	committed	an	indirect	expropriation.	More	recently,	however,	investment	tribunals	prefer	to	address	the	issue	of	legitimate	expectations	in	the	context	of	the	FET.29	When	discussing	this	treaty	standard,	arbitrators	often	interpret	foreign	investor	rights	following	the	doctrine	of	legitimate	expectations,	which	most	scholars	agree	is	an	issue	of	
																																								 																				24	G.	Schwarzenberger,	‘The	Abs-Shawcross	Draft	Convention	on	Investments	Abroad:	A	critical	commentary’,	9	Journal	of	Public	Law	(1960)	147,	148;	P	Proehl,	‘Private	Investments	Abroad’,	9	Journal	of	Public	Law	(1960)	362,	362.	More	recently,	see	UNCTAD,	
World	Investment	Report	1994:	Transnational	Corporations,	Employment	and	the	Workplace	(United	Nations,	1994)	286-8.		25	C	McLachlan,	‘Investment	Treaties	and	General	International	Law’,	57	International	and	
Comparative	Law	Quarterly	(2008)	361,	372;	Z	Douglas,	‘Nothing	if	not	Critical	for	Investment	Treaty	Arbitration:	Occidental,	Eureko	and	Methanex,’	22:1	Arbitration	
International	(2006)	27,	38.	26	Z	Douglas,	International	Investment	Claims	(Cambridge	UP,	2009),	41,	52-71.	See	also	H	Kjos,	Applicable	law	in	investor-state	arbitration:	the	interplay	between	national	and	
international	law	(Oxford	UP,	2013)	247.	27	Z	Douglas,	‘Property,	investment	and	the	scope	of	investment	protection	obligations,’	in	J	Pauwelyn,	Z	Douglas	&	J	Viñuales,	The	Foundations	of	International	Investment	Law:	
Bringing	Theory	into	Practice	(Oxford	UP,	2014)	363,	394	28	G	Alexander,	The	Global	Debate	over	Constitutional	Property:	lessons	for	American	takings	
jurisprudence	(Chicago,	UP	2006),	1-6,	57-62.	29	S	Fietta,	“Expropriation	and	the	'Fair	and	Equitable'	Standard,”	23:5	Journal	of	
International	Arbitration	(2006)	375,	378-85.	See	more	recently	Franck	Charles	Arif	v.	
Moldova,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/11/23,	Award,	8	April	2013,	¶¶	417-20,	530-7,	542-55;	Philip	Morris	v.	Uruguay,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/10/7,	Award,	8	July	2016,	¶¶	177-8,	235-71,	421-35	
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international	law.30	This	does	not	change	if	arbitrators	decide	to	interpret	FET	according	to	general	international	law.	Investment	tribunals	have	concluded	that	the	minimum	standard	of	treatment	(MST)	also	requires	the	protection	of	legitimate	expectations.31	The	awards	finding	that	foreign	investors	have	legitimate	expectations,	such	as	Micula	v.	Romania	and		Crystallex	v.	Venezuela,	are	amongst	the	most	controversial	decisions.32	When	the	facts	of	the	case	suggest	that	legitimate	expectations	were	created	and	subsequently	frustrated	by	the	host	state,	arbitrators	frequently	conclude	that	the	state	should	pay	some	compensation.33	Such	expectations	can	also	serve	to	reinforce	a	different	claim,	as	happened	in	Bilcon	v.	Canada.34	These	decisions	have	proved	controversial	amongst	countries	with	a	strong	interest	in	protecting	foreign	investment,	such	as	the	United	States	and	Canada.	The	United	States	has	submitted	to	a	number	of	investment	arbitrations	that	these	expectations	should	not	be	taken	into	account	when	deciding	a	dispute.	Canada	has	claimed	that	the	frustration	of	these	expectations	should	not	constitute	sufficient	reason	to	order	a	state	to	pay	compensation.35	These	two	states,	in	addition,	have	also	introduced	different	qualifications	to	foreign	investor	expectations	in	the	CETA	and	TPP	texts.36	These	reactions	against	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations	should	not	come	as	a	surprise.	Rose	claims	that	a	vital	question	to	decide	an	expropriation	dispute	is	“[w]hat	does	your	property	right	include?”37	This	should	not	be	any	different	in	the	case	of	investment	disputes.	Arbitrators	need	to	define	a	baseline	to	review	host	state	behavior.38	The	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	according	to	the	doctrine	of	legitimate	expectations	and	international	law	is	therefore	crucial.	Following	an	
																																								 																				30	Z	Douglas,	supra	note	26,	81.	See	also	Total	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/04/01,	Decision	on	Liability,	27	December	2010,	¶	128;	LG&E	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/1,	Decision	on	Liability,	3	October	2006,	¶	130.	31	Glamis	Gold	v.	the	U.S.A.,	UNCITRAL	–	NAFTA,	Award,	8	June	2009,	¶¶	621-2;	Gold	Reserve	
Inc.	v.	Bolivarian	Republic	of	Venezuela,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/09/1,	Award,	22	September	2014,	¶¶	575-6	(Hereafter	I	refer	only	to	FET	although	my	argument	applies	to	the	use	of	legitimate	expectations	under	both	the	FET	and	the	MST).	32	Ioan	Micula	v.	Romania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/20,	Award,	11	December	2013;	
Crystallex	v.	Venezuela,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/11/2,	Award,	4	April	2016.		33	See	M	Potestà	‘Legitimate	expectations	in	investment	treaty	law:	understanding	the	roots	and	the	limits	of	a	controversial	concept,’	28:1	ICSID	review	(2013)	88.	34	Bilcon	v.	Canada,	UNCITRAL,	PCA	Case	No.	2009-04,	Award	on	Jurisdiction	and	Liability	17	March	2015.					35	L	Johson	&	L	Peterson,	‘As	Canada	straddles	CETA	and	NAFTA,	an	effort	is	made	in	a	new	pleading	to	define	legitimate	expectations’	IAReporter,	26	May	2015.	36	Draft	of	TPP	Art.	9.6	(4	and	5);	Draft	of	CETA	Art.	8.9-10.	37	C	Rose,	Property	and	persuasion	Essays	on	the	history,	theory,	and	rhetoric	of	ownership	(Westview	Press,	1994)	50,	49-70.	38	See	J	Sprankling,	The	international	law	of	property	(Oxford	UP,	2014)	4,	18,	251-92;	J	Paulsson,	‘Universal	arbitration	–	what	we	gain,	what	we	lose,’	The	Alexander	Lecture	-	Chartered	Institute	of	Arbitrators,	29	November	2012	(Draft	3	December	2012)	10.	
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important	strand	of	property	literature,	the	study	of	this	interpretation	requires	an	inquiry	into	what	the	arbitrators	and	most	influential	actors	imagine	to	be	the	justification,	comprehensive	view,	or	purpose	of	foreign	investor	rights.39	This	is	the	first	step	to	understanding	the	interpretative	framework	that	guides	arbitrators.		
2.	The	purpose	of	foreign	investor	rights:	wealth	maximization	
	The	purpose	of	property	can	be	normatively	closed	or	plural	and	diverse.	This	may	reflect	a	delicate	balance	or	unresolved	normative	tensions.	In	the	United	States,	for	instance,	many	scholars	refer	to	constitutional	property	law	as	a	muddle.40	This	muddle	is	the	result	of	unresolved	conflicts	between	stability	and	change,	the	individual	and	the	community,	and	wealth	maximization	and	propriety.	In	the	last	decades,	some	of	the	most	important	studies	on	property	have	explored	these	tensions	relying	on	different	frameworks:	general-based	and	special-based	rights	(Waldron);	neo-utilitarianism	and	propriety	(Rose);	or	commodity	and	propriety	(Alexander).41	These	frameworks	highlight	different	tensions	in	the	interpretation	of	property,	but	also	deal	with	a	common	issue:	the	conflict	between	property	as	a	way	to	create,	maintain,	or	destroy	a	community,	and	property	as	a	means	to	facilitate	wealth	maximization.		 According	to	Rose	and	Alexander,	the	interpretation	of	property	depends	on	whether	we	follow	a	propriety	or	wealth	maximization	conception.	The	idea	of	propriety	focuses	on	the	social	importance	of	property.	Property	as	propriety	aims	at	promoting	civic	habits.	This	conception	of	property	highlights	the	importance	of	this	legal	institution	for	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	a	proper	social	order.	In	this	understanding,	property	serves	to	ensure	individual	autonomy	as	much	as	it	promotes	a	society	where	individuals	have	rights	and	obligations	towards	the	community.	Property	as	wealth	maximization,	on	the	contrary,	promotes	the	conditions	under	which	individuals	engage	in	efficient	economic	activities.	The	starting	point	is	the	individual	incentive	to	maximize	self-interest.	As	opposed	to	propriety,	then,	wealth	maximization	highlights	the	private	character	of	property	rights	and	the	need	for	a	social	order	capable	of	enabling	self-interest.						 The	relationship	between	wealth	maximization	and	propriety	can	be	useful	for	understanding	the	arbitral	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	
																																								 																				39	See	G	Alexander,	supra	note	28;	C	Rose,	supra	note	37;	J	Waldron,	The	Right	To	Private	
Property	(Clarendon,	1988)	433.	40	C	Rose,	‘Mahon	Reconstructed:	Why	the	Takings	Issue	is	Still	a	Muddle,’	57	Southern	
California	Law	Review	(1984)	561.	41	See	above	39	and	G	Alexander,	Commodity	&	Propriety:	Competing	Visions	of	Property	in	
American	Legal	Thought,	1776-1970	(Chicago	UP,	1997).	
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rights.	My	argument	is	that	arbitrators	privilege	wealth	maximization	over	other	purposes	such	as	propriety.	This	does	not	mean	that	investment	tribunals	always	favor	foreign	investors.	The	claim	is	that	arbitrators	follow	this	utilitarian	conception	of	property	in	both	a	descriptive	and	a	prescriptive	way.	First,	awards	focus	on	interpretations	that	correspond	to	the	efficient	use	of	local	resources	by	foreign	investors.	Secondly,	they	promote	a	social	order	where	societies	are	better	off	when	they	maximize	net	wealth.	This	interpretation	may	favor	foreign	investor	interests,	but	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	assume	that	this	is	the	ultimate	purpose	of	foreign	investor	rights.	After	all,	some	economic	prosperity	is	important	for	most	conceptions	of	property.	But	the	problem	is	that	investment	arbitrators	pay	excessive	attention	to	wealth	maximization	(A),	overlooking	the	normative	and	distributional	consequences	of	this	preference	(B).42			
A.	Foreign	investor	rights	and	wealth	maximization	The	positive	role	of	foreign	investment	for	economic	activity	is	a	major	reason	for	international	investment	protection.	Foreign	investment	can	help	countries	to	catch	up	with	the	global	economy	and	increase	their	competitiveness.	In	this	regard,	the	Grand	Bargain	in	most	investment	treaties	consists	of	an	exchange	between	capital	protection	and	the	‘prospect	of	more	capital	in	the	future.’43	Protecting	foreign	investor	rights	through	international	arbitration	is	a	means	to	promote	foreign	investment	and	facilitate	business	operations.	The	international	investment	regime,	in	this	way,	is	part	of	a	neoliberal	project	for	economic	development.44	According	to	this	project,	states	should	create	property	institutions	capable	of	enabling	efficient	actors	–in	this	case	multinational	corporations	(MNCs)–	to	determine	the	best	use	of	resources.45		 Most	investment	tribunals	follow	this	idea.	Arbitrators	note	that	private	property,	contracts,	and	regulatory	institutions	play	a	fundamental	role	in	attracting	foreign	investment	and	facilitating	multinational	corporate	activity.	They	praise	the	work	of	the	World	Bank	and	the	United	Nations	in	assisting	countries	to	implement	institutions	that	ensure	the	certainty	of	foreign	investor	rights	and	obligations.46	They	also	react	negatively	when	states	make	substantial	or	political	reforms	to	their	regulatory	
																																								 																				42	This	reasoning	borrows	from	G	Alexander	&	E	Peñalver,	supra	note	9,	17-34.			43	Salacuse	&	Sullivan,	‘Do	BITs	Really	Work?:	An	Evaluation	of	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	and	Their	Grand	Bargain,’	46	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	(2005)	67,	77.	44	See	D.	Schneiderman,	Constitutionalizing	Economic	Globalization.	Investment	Rules	and	
Democracy’s	Promise	(2008).	45	See	D	North,	Structure	and	Change	in	Economic	History	(1981)	20-4.	46	CMS	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	case	No.	ARB/01/8,	12	May	2005,	Award,	¶¶	134-137;	TECO	v.	
Guatemala,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/10/23,	19	December	2013,	Award,	¶¶	89,	90,	94,	506,	533;	
Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	UNCITRAL,	PCA	Case	No.	2011-17,	Award,	31	January	2014,	¶¶	97-102,	104,	113-114.					
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environments.47	Tribunals	underscore	that	predictability	enables	foreign	investors	to	make	rational	calculations.	And	the	protection	of	these	calculations	is	fundamental	for	promoting	foreign	investment	and	economic	prosperity.	The	tribunal	in	Suez	v.	Argentina	notes	that			The	theoretical	basis	of	this	approach	no	doubt	is	found	in	the	work	of	the	eminent	scholar	Max	Weber,	who	advanced	the	idea	that	one	of	the	main	contributions	of	law	to	any	social	system	is	to	make	economic	life	more	calculable	and	also	argued	that	capitalism	arose	in	Europe	because	European	law	demonstrated	a	high	degree	of	‘calculability.’48		 A	similar	idea	lies	behind	the	creation	of	the	International	Centre	for	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	(ICSID).49	The	Washington	Convention	begins	by	highlighting	‘the	need	for	international	cooperation	for	economic	development,	and	the	role	of	private	international	investment	therein.’50	Many	investment	awards	follow	this	premise.	Arbitrators	describe	foreign	investment	protection	not	only	as	a	privilege	of	foreign	investors	but	also	as	a	means	to	economic	development.	For	them,	foreign	investors	deserve	protection	because	they	invest	for	profit	as	much	as	to	assist	countries	in	reaching	their	economic	goals.	The	Libyan	awards	put	forward	this	argument	in	the	1970s,51	and	were	followed	later	in	AMCO	v.	Indonesia,	where	the	arbitrators	underscore	that			the	[ICSID]	Convention	is	aimed	to	protect,	to	the	same	extent	and	with	the	same	vigour	the	investor	and	the	host	state,	not	forgetting	that	to	protect	investments	is	to	protect	the	general	interest	of	development	and	of	developing	countries.52		 The	premise	that	foreign	investment	is	a	major	catalyst	for	economic	growth	became	very	popular	in	the	1990s,	hand	in	hand	with	neoliberalism,	and	it	still	maintains	much	of	this	momentum.	According	to	this	economic	
																																								 																				47	See	Vandevelde,	‘A	unified	theory	of	fair	and	equitable	treatment,’	43	New	York	
University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics	(2010)	43,	60-3;	D.	Schneiderman,	
Resisting	economic	globalization:	critical	theory	and	international	investment	law	(Palgrave,	2013)	62-70.		48	Suez	and	others	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/17,	30	July	2010,	Decision	on	Liability,	¶¶	222,	207.	Similarly,	TECMED	v.	Mexico,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB	(AF)/00/2,	29	May	2003,	Award,	¶	156;	Thunderbird	v.	Mexico,	NAFTA	-	UNCITRAL,	1	December	2005,	Thomas	Wälde's	Separate	Opinion,	¶¶	5,	47.			49	A	Parra,	The	History	of	ICSID	(Oxford	UP,	2012)	12-26	50	Preamble,	Convention	on	the	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	between	States	and	Nationals	of	Other	States,	18	March	1965,	575	U.N.T.S.	192.	51	A	Anghie,	Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law	(2004)	226-9;	M.	Sornarajah,	The	International	Law	on	Foreign	Investment	(2010)	291.	52	Amco	v.	Indonesia,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/81/1,	25	September	1983,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	¶	23.	Similarly,	Siemens	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/8,	3	August	2004,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	¶	81;	Vivendi	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/97/3,	20	August	2007,	Award,	¶	7.4.4.	
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policy,	states	need	to	attract	as	much	foreign	investment	as	possible,	while	refraining	from	interfering	with	private	rational	calculations.	In	the	preamble	of	the	US	1984	model	BIT,	the	purpose	of	these	treaties	is	described	as	a	way	to	create	‘a	stable	framework	for	investment	and	maximum	effective	utilization	of	economic	resources.’	This	rhetoric	remains	the	same	in	the	2004	and	2012	model	BITs,	which	just	add	that	this	stable	framework	would	also	‘improve	living	standards,’	in	a	reference	to	trickle-down	economics.53			 Investment	tribunals	have	echoed	this	win-win	rhetoric	in	the	awards.	Like	in	the	neoclassical	account	of	free	trade,	the	premise	is	that	maximizing	wealth	through	foreign	investment	benefits	everybody:	host	states,	local	actors,	and	foreign	investors.	The	outcome	of	this	interpretation,	in	other	words,	should	not	just	be	protecting	foreign	investor	rights.	The	arbitrators	in	El	Paso	v.	Argentina	and	Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador	underscore	this	point	when	explaining	that		the	reference	to	the	Preamble	said	that	its	object	and	purpose	was	to	maintain	‘a	stable	framework	for	investment	and	maximum	effective	use	of	economic	resources;’	however,	in	determining	what	these	purposes	implied	for	the	interpretation	of	FET,	the	tribunals	in	these	two	cases	only	retained	the	first	purpose,	in	order	to	conclude	that	a	stable	legal	and	business	environment	is	an	essential	element	of	fair	and	equitable	treatment,	without	taking	into	account	the	goal	that	any	State	has	to	pursue	as	well,	which	is	to	guarantee	to	its	population	maximum	effective	use	of	its	economic	resources.54		 This	passage	shows	that	favoring	wealth	maximization	is	not	the	same	as	promoting	foreign	investor	interests.	These	two	awards	highlight	that	host	states	are	responsible	to	maximize	the	benefits	and	minimize	the	costs	of	foreign	investment.	The	interpretation	of	FET,	therefore,	cannot	amount	to	freezing	the	public	regulation	of	business.	The	tribunal	in	Saluka	v.	The	
Czech	Republic	made	a	similar	point	when	noting	that	supporting	wealth	maximization	implies	not	only	sanctioning	political	measures	that	do	not	promote	foreign	investment,	but	also	reconsidering	interpretative	outcomes	that	could	deter	host	states	from	attracting	foreign	investors.55				
																																								 																				53	The	US	Model	BITs	are	available	at	http://www.bilaterals.org/?-us-bits-	(6	January	2017).	54	El	Paso	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	no	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶	369;	Ulysseas	
v.	Ecuador,	UNCITRAL,	12	June	2012,	Award,	¶	248.	Similarly,	see	TECMED	v.	Mexico,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB	(AF)/00/2,	29	May	2003,	Award,	¶	156.	55	Saluka	v.	the	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Partial	Award,	17	March	2006,	¶¶	300,	304;	
LG&E	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/1,	Decision	on	Liability,	3	October	2006,	¶	158.	
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B.	Wealth	maximization	and	other	purposes		The	problem	of	excessively	focusing	on	wealth	maximization,	as	Alexander	and	Rose	highlight,	is	that	this	may	occlude	other	normative	and	the	relational	dimensions	of	property.	The	consensus	in	progressive	property	theory	is	that	property	responds	to	the	characteristics	of	each	community.	Dagan	explains	that	‘the	meaning	of	property	is	not	homogeneous	but	varies	instead	with	its	social	settings.’56	The	arbitral	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights,	however,	contrasts	with	a	plural	conception	of	property.	Foreign	investor	rights	should	not	vary	according	to	the	social	setting	because	they	serve	to	facilitate	foreign	investment	globally.	As	Schneiderman	claims,	the	international	investment	regime	operates	as	a	‘normatively	closed’	but	‘cognitively	open’	legal	regime.57	The	interpretation	of	investment	tribunals	is	cognitively	open	regarding	the	process	of	wealth	maximization,	which	is	increasingly	global,	but	normatively	closed	when	it	comes	to	the	social	and	local	dimension	of	property.		 The	substitution	of	the	concept	of	investment	for	the	concept	of	property	in	investment	treaties	is	an	important	indicator	of	this	normative	preference.	Most	investment	literature	and	awards	draw	a	connection	between	the	notion	of	investment	and	economic	development.	Foreign	investments	represent	a	bundle	of	assets	capable	of	facilitating	economic	development,	as	opposed	to,	for	instance,	simple	speculation.58	But	this	dominant	view	has	overlooked	that	the	notion	of	investment	also	serves	to	occlude	other	purposes	for	local	resources.	Contrary	to	a	plural	view	of	property,	an	investment	is	limited	to	the	maximization	of	local	wealth.	It	is	about	the	rational	use	of	resources	for	a	period	of	time,	with	the	goal	of	creating	wealth	and	the	expectation	of	making	a	profit.59			 Most	investment	tribunals	include	an	additional	aspect	to	the	definition	of	investment:	the	assumption	of	a	business	risk.60	A	foreign	investor	creates	a	series	of	business,	social,	and	cultural	risks	when	establishing	in	a	host	country.61	But	most	tribunals	find	that	the	criterion	to	distinguish	an	investment	from	other	economic	activities	is	just	business	risk.	In	this	way,	tribunals	presume	that	foreign	investors	are	only	assuming	the	business	risks,	whereas	the	social	and	cultural	risks	remain	allocated	to	host	states	and	local	communities.	This	distribution	may	seem	unfair;	however,	it	is	
																																								 																				56	H	Dagan,	Property,	Values	and	Institutions	(2011)	44;	J	Waldron,	supra	note	39,	52.	57	D	Schneiderman,	‘Legitimacy	and	Reflexivity	in	International	Investment	Arbitration:	A	New	Self-Restraint?,’	4	Journal	of	International	Dispute	Settlement	(2011)	471,	494.	58	See	Fedax	v.	Venezuela,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/96/3,	11	July	1997,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	¶	43.		59	Pey	Casado	v.	Chile,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/98/2,	May	8,	2008,	Award,	¶	232;	UNCITRAL,	
Romak	v.	Uzbekistan,	UNCITRAL,	PCA	Case	No.	AA280,	November	26,	2009,	Award,	¶	207.		60	Ibid.		61	C	Dannreuther	&	R	Lekhi,	‘Globalization	and	the	political	economy	of	risk,’	7	Review	of	
International	Political	Economy	(2000)	574.	
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consistent	with	the	purpose	of	maximizing	wealth	through	foreign	investment.	From	a	neoliberal	point	of	view,	this	purpose	could	be	defeated	if	foreign	investors	were	supposed	to	include	social	and	local	relations	in	their	calculations.62			 The	late-2000s	recalibration	of	the	international	investment	regime	does	not	change	this	purpose	significantly.	At	first,	in	the	early	2000s,	investment	awards	focused	on	the	stability	of	the	business	framework,	but	this	has	changed	as	more	recent	decisions	aim	to	strike	the	correct	balance	between	foreign	investor	rights	and	states’	regulatory	authority.63	This	recalibration	has	been	accompanied	by	the	effort	of	influential	scholars	to	focus	on	economic	development	as	the	purpose	of	the	international	investment	regime.	These	authors	claim	that	the	primary	function	of	this	regime	is	to	promote	economic	development,	while	also	allowing	states	to	curb	negative	externalities.64	This	position	describes	the	international	investment	regime	as	a	field	cognitively	open	to	the	needs	of	economically	efficient	regulation.65	As	noted	before,	wealth	maximization	is	not	a	synonym	for	foreign	investor	interests.	But	this	does	not	mean	that	new	regulation	could	promote	different	normative	preferences	and	disrupt	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations.	When	it	comes	to	assessing	regulatory	change,	as	Vandevelde	notes,	tribunals	favor	consistency.66			 In	a	similar	vein,	the	use	of	proportionality	in	investment	awards	does	not	amount	to	a	paradigmatic	shift	in	the	purpose	of	foreign	investor	rights.67	Proportionality	operates	within	the	dominant	interpretative	framework.	In	his	study	of	global	constitutional	property,	Alexander	recognizes	some	advantages	of	using	proportionality	but	he	observes	that	what	really	matters	is	the	purpose	that	guides	the	interpretation	of	the	rights.	Proportionality	cannot	change	an	excessive	focus	on	wealth	maximization.	At	best,	it	can	enable	states	to	implement	economically	efficient	regulation,	i.e.	to	reduce	the	costs.68	In	this	way,	it	transpires	that	after	recalibrating	the	
																																								 																				62	M	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics:	Lectures	at	The	Collège	de	France,	1978—1979	(Palgrave,	2010)	279;	Schneiderman,	supra	note	47,	44.	63	Contrast	Occidental	v.	Ecuador	(Number	1),	LCIA	Case	No.	UN3467,	1	July	2004,	Award,	¶	183	and	CMS	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	12	May	2005,	Award,	¶	274	against	
Saluka	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	17	March	2006,	Partial	Award,	¶	307;	and	El	Paso	v.	
Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶¶	338-55.			64	Schreuer	&	Kriebaum,	‘From	Individual	to	Community	Interest	in	International	Investment	Law,’	in	Ulrich	Fastenrath	et	al.	(Eds.)	From	Bilateralism	to	Community	Interest	
Essays	in	Honour	of	Bruno	Simma	(2011)	1080;	Y	Radi,	‘International	Investment	Law	and	Development:	A	History	of	Two	Concepts,’	in	S	Schill	et	al.	International	Investment	Law	
and	Development:	Bridging	the	Gap	(Edward	Elgar,	2015)	69.	65	Schneiderman,	supra	note	57,	494.	66	Vandevelde,	supra	note	47,	49-51.	67	The	use	of	proportionality	has	been	promoted	as	an	interpretative	method	to	recalibrate	the	international	investment	regime.	See	Schill,	supra	note	19.	68	Alexander,	note	28,	207-8,	214-8.	A	more	pessimistic	view	about	proportionality	is	put	forward	by	Schneiderman,	who	claims	that	proportionality	follows	the	legal	typology	that	
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international	investment	regime,	foreign	investor	rights	continue	protecting	foreign	investment	from	competing	normative	preferences.			
3.	Specifying	foreign	investor	rights:	a	transactional	view	of	foreign	
investor	relations	The	purpose	of	wealth	maximization	shapes	the	arbitral	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights.	The	objective	of	this	section	is	to	identify	and	trace	this	influence	in	the	awards.	To	start	with,	this	requires	explaining	how	this	purpose	impacts	on	the	interpretative	framework	used	by	investment	arbitrators.	Rose	notes	that	there	is	a	close	link	between	the	purpose	of	wealth	maximization	and	the	contractualization	of	property.	This	occurs	when	property	is	justified	on	individual	labor	or,	as	in	this	case,	on	the	act	of	investing.69	Waldron	arrives	at	a	similar	conclusion	when	he	compares	Lockean	(special-based)	and	Hegelian	(general-based)	conceptions	of	property.	While	special-based	property	frames	the	individual	relationship	with	the	state	in	contractual	terms,	a	general-based	view	of	property	focuses	rather	on	the	political	relationship	that	property	creates	between	individuals	and	the	state.70			 Most	investment	tribunals	follow	a	special-based	conception	of	property.	The	act	of	investing	in	itself	justifies	the	protection	of	foreign	investor	rights	because	of	the	potential	economic	benefits	of	foreign	investment.	This	is	a	good	reason	for	conceptualizing	the	relations	between	foreign	investors	and	host	states	according	to	a	transactional	model.	Conceptualizing	these	relations	in	transactional	terms	is	an	important	feature	of	an	‘MNC-assisted	restructuring’	of	host	states.71			 For	investment	tribunals,	states	have	the	‘responsibility	to	create	an	adapted	and	evolutionary	framework	for	the	development	of	economic	activities,’72	and	this	calls	for	the	contractualization	of	foreign	investment	relations.73	In	traditional	liberal	terms,	contracts	relate	to	the	promotion	of	an	individualized	image	of	humanity	and	a	limited	government.	This	view	draws	a	clear	line	between	the	private	and	the	public.	The	current	idea	of	contractual	governance	slightly	changes	this	traditional	approach	by	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 		Weber	associates	with	the	diffusion	of	capitalism	and	investor	calculability.	See	D	Schneiderman,	‘Judging	in	Secular	Times:	Max	Weber	and	the	Rise	of	Proportionality,’	63	
Supreme	Court	Law	Review	(2013)	557,	558-60.				69	Rose,	supra	note	37,	49-70.	70	Waldron,	supra	note	39,	106-36.	71	UNCTAD,	World	Investment	Report	1995:	transnational	corporations	and	competitiveness	(United	Nations,	1995)	262.		72	El	Paso	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶	650.	Investment	arbitrators	have	been	even	more	vocal	about	this	responsibility	in	the	past,	see	
MTD	v.	Chile,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/7,	May	2004,	Award,	¶113.			73	Teubner,	‘In	The	Blind	Spot:	The	hybridization	of	contracting’,	8	Theoretical	Inquiries	in	
Law	(2007)	51,	69-70.	
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making	the	limitations	included	in	transactions	internal	to	the	operation	of	governments.74	This	has	little	to	do	with	a	laissez-faire	economic	model.	States	are	expected	to	play	major	roles	in	foreign	investment	relations.	An	evolutionary	framework	for	the	development	of	economic	activities,	such	as	the	one	promoted	by	investment	tribunals,	places	these	governmental	roles	–whether	or	not	they	follow	a	contractual	model–	within	a	transactional	paradigm	of	formal	equality,	autonomy,	and	of	no	effects	on	third	parties.	This	means	that	most	foreign	investor	rights	do	not	come	from	above.	They	emerge	from	below.			 These	rights	emerge	as	the	outcome	of	transactions	disconnected	from	local	preferences	and	expectations.	In	the	investment	law	literature,	it	is	common	to	find	positive	references	to	the	transactional	paradigm	of	foreign	investor	and	host	state	relations.	The	argument	is	that	this	model	promotes	neutrality	by	depoliticizing	investment	disputes.	Most	of	the	time,	the	literature	explains	that	this	is	because	investment	arbitration	eliminates	state-to-state	diplomatic	controversies.75	A	closer	look	at	the	international	investment	regime,	however,	reveals	that	this	alleged	depoliticization	also	strengthens	the	particular	politics	of	wealth	maximization	through	foreign	investment.	As	Van	Harten	claims,	this	regime	puts	foreign	investors	on	the	same	level	as	host	states	in	relationships	that	normally	are	proprietary	or	regulatory,	and	not	contractual.76			 This	transactional	paradigm	has	important	consequences	for	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Foreign	investors	do	not	like	adverse	changes	to	their	entitlements.	Whereas	the	main	principle	of	property	is	that	the	law	is	meant	to	change,	the	transactional	paradigm	that	rules	foreign	investment	is	inspired	by	the	principle	of	pacta	sunt	servanda	according	to	international	law.	This	is	a	very	rigid	interpretation	of	contracts.	In	the	field	of	foreign	investment,	Anghie	and	Sornarajah	have	shown	that	international	tribunals	–including	investment	tribunals–	conceptualize	the	relationships	between	host	states,	home	states,	and	foreign	investors	in	strict	contractual	terms.77	This	conclusion	is	not	unavoidable,	as	Koskenniemi	notes,	since	sovereignty	can	be	justified	in	either	contractual	or	communitarian	terms.78	But	the	choice	of	pacta	sunt	
servanda	is	consistent	with	the	purpose	of	wealth	maximization.	After	foreign	investor	rights	pass	through	the	prism	of	pacta	sunt	servanda,	the	
																																								 																				74	Zumbansen,	‘The	Law	of	Society:	Governance	Through	Contract,’	14	Indiana	Journal	of	
Global	Legal	Studies		(2007)	191,	203-6.	75	I	Shihata,	‘Towards	a	Greater	Depoliticization	of	Investment	Disputes:	The	Role	of	ICSID	and	MIGA,’	1	ICSID	Review	(1986)	1;	Ecuador	v.	United	States,	4	April	2012,	Expert	Opinion	with	respect	to	jurisdiction	of	Professor	W.	Michael	Reisman,	¶	37.	76	Van	Harten,	supra	note	18,	45.	77	A	Anghie,	supra	note	51,	239-40;	M	Sornarajah,	supra	note	51,	291.	78	M	Koskenniemi,	‘The	Politics	of	International	Law,’	1	European	Journal	of	International	
Law	(1990)	4,	30.	
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public	considerations	that	support	the	exercise	of	sovereign	discretion	are	squeezed	out	and	a	strong	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights	is	justified.			 The	reasoning	of	investment	awards	shows	this	outcome	in	many	ways.	The	moment	of	establishment	always	plays	a	crucial	role	for	the	specification	of	foreign	investor	rights	and	privileges,	promoting	an	analogy	between	a	foreign	investment	and	a	transaction	or	bargain.79	Following	this	analogy,	many	tribunals	rely	on	the	principle	of	good	faith	to	affirm	that	states	can	modify	the	law	in	a	general	and	non-discriminatory	manner,	but	only	as	long	as	they	take	into	account	foreign	investor	expectations.80	Most	arbitrators	recognize	that	host	states	have	a	right	to	regulate	and	that	no	foreign	investor	could	rationally	expect	that	the	laws	affecting	their	business	will	never	change.	This	expectation,	they	note,	would	not	be	the	result	of	a	rational	investment	decision.	At	the	same	time,	investment	tribunals	emphasize	that	states	need	to	respect	foreign	investor	expectations	because	they	serve	to	‘facilitate	rational	planning	and	decision	making.’81			 The	promotion	of	consistency	in	favor	of	foreign	investors	is	a	means	to	facilitate	foreign	investor	calculations	and	promote	wealth	maximization.	According	to	a	neoliberal	economic	model,	foreign	investor	rights	are	instrumental	in	increasing	economic	growth.	The	process	of	wealth	maximization	requires	that	foreign	investors	remain	blind	to	local	preferences	related	to	foreign	investment.82	Investment	arbitration,	in	this	sense,	facilitates	foreign	investment	in	two	different	ways.	First,	it	diverts	the	attention	from	the	interconnectedness	of	the	legal	order.	The	relationship	between	foreign	investors	and	host	states	is	transactional	(and	host	state	laws	apply	according	to	these	terms).	This	can	affect	states’	regulatory	authority	as	well	as	any	propriety	dimension	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Secondly,	in	the	event	of	a	dispute,	most	investment	tribunals	would	look	at	the	controversy	from	a	contractual	perspective,	typical	of	arbitration,	paying	less	if	any	attention	to	factors	that	escape	a	strict	transactional	view	of	foreign	investment	relations.83			
																																								 																				79	C	Schreuer	and	U	Kriebaum,	‘At	What	Time	Must	Legitimate	Expectations	Exist?’,	in	J	Werner	&	A	Ali	(eds.)	A	Liber	Amicorum:	Thomas	Wälde	(2009)	265,	271.	80	TECMED	v.	Mexico,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB	(AF)/00/2,	Award,	29	May	2003,	¶	122.	Similarly,	
CME	v.	The	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Partial	Award,	13	September	2001,	¶	611;	BG	Group	
Plc.	v.	Argentina,	UNCITRAL,	24	December	2007,	at	343-344,	409.	81	Frontier	Petroleum	v.	the	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	12	November	2010,	Award,	¶	285.	Similarly,	see	Saluka	v.	the	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	17	March	2006,	Partial	Award,	¶	306;	Total	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/04/01,	27	December	2010,	Decision	on	Liability,	¶	123;	El	Paso	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶	358.	82	Foucault,	supra	note	62.	83	M	Hirsch,	‘Investment	tribunals	and	human	rights	treaties:	a	sociological	perspective,’	in	F	Baetens	(ed.)	Investment	Law	within	International	Law:	Integrationist	perspectives	(2013)	
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	 This	transactional	view	contrasts	with	the	large	relational	effects	of	foreign	investment	on	local	actors.	The	scope	of	the	relational	effects	is	supposed	to	be	a	key	distinction	between	contract	and	property.	Contracts,	as	opposed	to	property,	produce	effects	as	between	the	parties	only.84	But	this	distinction	does	not	hold	when	the	object	of	the	transactions	is	to	modify	the	right	to	use	resources,	as	is	the	case	with	most	foreign	investor	rights.	When	a	host	state	enters	into	negotiations	with	a	foreign	investor	to	transfer	the	operation	of	a	waste	disposal	unit,	as	in	TECMED	v.	Mexico,	the	effects	of	these	dealings	and	any	eventual	bargain	exceeds	the	state’s	right	to	regulate.85			 In	this	transactional	model	of	foreign	investment	relations,	it	is	not	difficult	to	assume	that	everything	worth	considering	is	included	in	the	act	of	investing.	For	arbitrators,	foreign	investors	contribute	to	public	welfare	by	mixing	their	ownership	advantages	with	the	locational	advantages	of	host	states.	Along	these	lines,	tribunals	tend	to	deny	any	form	of	solidarity	beyond	the	strict	terms	of	the	foreign	investment	bargain	–	i.e.	beyond	the	act	of	mixing	ownership	with	locational	advantages.	This	follows	a	Lockean	interpretation	of	property	rights.	This	reasoning	assumes	that	the	bargains	include	most	relevant	information	(A),	making	the	interpretation	of	each	bargain	very	significant	(B).		
A.	The	foreign	investment	bargain	Investment	law	literature	and	awards	often	follow	a	contractualist	conception	of	property.	According	to	this	conception,	individuals	acquire	property	because	of	their	human	condition,	and	after	mixing	their	labor	with	resources.	A	common	critique	of	contractual	theories	of	property	is	that	they	do	not	deal	with	the	private	side	of	the	agreement.	They	only	refer	to	the	risks	posed	by	the	public	authority,	overlooking	or	minimizing	private	power.	Supporters	of	these	theories	rarely	acknowledge	that	the	historical	origin	of	property	may	also	lie	in	conquest,	domination,	or	unfair	bargaining	terms.86	In	the	international	investment	regime,	the	basis	for	the	acquisition	and	protection	of	foreign	investor	rights	lies	in	the	act	of	investing,	but	there	is	no	substantial	difference	in	terms	of	outcome.	On	the	one	hand,	the	need	to	protect	foreign	investor	rights	from	host	state	intervention;	on	the	other,	the	consequent	downplaying	of	foreign	investor	power	and	local	preferences.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 		85,	99;	Glamis	v.	United	States,	NAFTA	–UNCITRAL,	8	June	2009,	Award,	¶¶	1-7;	ICSID,	
Minnotte	&	Lewis	v.	Poland,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB	(AF)/10/1,	16	May	2014,	Award,	¶	155.	84	Alexander	&	Peñalver,	supra	note	9,	2.	85	TECMED	v.	Mexico,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB	(AF)/00/2,	29	May	2003,	Award,	¶¶	88-92.	86	J	Singer,	‘Original	Acquisition	of	Property:	From	Conquest	&	Possession	to	Democracy	&Equal	Opportunity’,	86	Indiana	Law	Journal	(2011)	763,	764-6;	L	Wenar,	‘Original	Acquisition	of	Private	Property’,	107	Mind	(1998)	799.	
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	 Business	and	investment	law	scholars	normally	describe	the	acquisition	of	foreign	investor	rights	using	either	the	hold-up	or	the	obsolescing	bargain	model	(OBM).	These	two	models	assert	that	‘once	the	investor	makes	the	investment	and	thereby	places	its	capital	under	the	sovereignty	of	the	host	state,	its	bargaining	power	diminishes,	and	the	commitments	received	risk	becoming	obsolete	in	the	eyes	of	the	host	government.’87	The	starting	point	is	the	idea	of	political	risk,	which	Comeaux	and	Kinsella	describe	as	‘the	risk	that	the	laws	of	the	country	will	unexpectedly	change	to	the	investor’s	detriment	after	the	investor	has	invested	capital	in	the	country,	thereby	reducing	the	value	of	the	individual’s	investment.’88			 This	way	of	looking	at	foreign	investor	rights	has	implications	for	foreign	investor	and	host	state	bargaining	dynamics.	Foreign	investment	relations	are	not	as	simple	as	the	OBM	and	hold-up	model	predict.	Foreign	investors	have	an	incentive	to	make	the	best	possible	deals,	increasing	their	profit,	and	this	includes	shifting	as	much	as	risk	as	possible	to	host	states	and	other	local	actors.	Some	World	Investment	Reports	warn	about	this	problem,	recommending	governments	to	improve	their	bargaining	skills.	They	recognize,	however,	that	this	is	difficult	because	some	MNCs	have	more	resources	and	information	than	many	states.89	Large	firms	have	connections	with	financial	institutions	and	their	home	states,	and	they	may	also	have	the	capacity	to	move	their	business	elsewhere.90	All	this	indicates	that	the	OBM	and	hold-up	model	focus	on	only	half	the	story.	In	practice,	both	states	and	foreign	investors	may	become	prisoners	of	the	other.				 The	partial	account	of	foreign	investment	relations	weakens	host	states’	position.	It	disregards	the	bargaining	power	of	foreign	investors	before	and	after	the	establishment	of	foreign	investment.	Before	establishment,	states	lacking	domestic	capital	need	to	attract	foreign	investment	by	offering	a	good	investment	climate	or	specific	incentives.	In	the	free	market	of	foreign	investment,	there	are	no	checks	on	the	business-friendly	conditions	that	foreign	investors	can	impose	on	states,	or	that	host	states	offer	to	foreign	investors.	While	there	is	evidence	of	unfair	deals	for	host	states,	foreign	investor	behavior	is	restricted	by	voluntary	standards	only.91	After	
																																								 																				87	Salacuse,	supra	note	1,	451.	88	P	Comeaux	&	N	Kinsella,	‘Reducing	Political	Risk	in	Developing	Countries:	Bilateral	Treaties,	Stabilization	Clauses	and	MIGA	and	OPIC	Investment	Insurance,’	15	New	York	Law	
School	Journal	of	International	and	Comparative	Law	(1994)	1,	4.	89	UNCTAD,	World	Investment	Report	2007:	Transnational	Corporations,	Extractive.	
Industries	and	Development	(United	Nations,	2007)	159;	UNCTAD,	World	Investment	Report	
2008:	Transnational	Corporations	and	the	Infrastructure	Challenge	(United	Nations,	2008)	143.	90	E	Aisbett	&	L	Poulsen,	‘Relative	Treatment	of	Aliens:	Firm-Level	Evidence	from	Developing	Countries,’	Oxford	University	GEG	Working	Paper	122	(2016)	6-7,	19.		91	IISD,	‘Lifting	the	Lid	on	Foreign	Investment	Contracts:	The	Real	Deal	for	Sustainable	Development,’	1	Sustainable	Markets	(2005)	1;	A	Shemberg,	‘Stabilization	Clauses	and	
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establishment,	the	narrative	changes	from	free	markets	to	political	risk	and	foreign	investor	need	for	protection.	The	OBM	and	the	hold-up	model	concentrate	only	on	the	promises	that	host	states	make	at	the	time	of	investment	but	may	ignore	later.				 Foreign	investment	relations,	in	sum,	are	not	as	clear	as	these	models	or	the	idea	of	pacta	sunt	servanda	suggests.	Governments	accept	some	conditions	explicitly	but	also	resist	some	demands	from	foreign	investors.	An	important	critique	to	the	OBM	and	the	hold-up	models	is	that	they	rely	on	an	abstract	conception	of	foreign	investment	bargains.	In	practice,	there	is	not	always	a	contract,	and	contracts	are	incomplete	by	definition.92	The	use	of	the	word	bargain,	in	other	words,	is	just	part	of	a	narrative.	The	establishment	of	an	investment	can	always	be	described	as	a	bargain	between	foreign	investor	and	host	state.	But	this	does	not	tell	us	much	about	the	nature	of	the	legal	relations	or	the	scope	of	the	emerging	rights	and	duties.	Did	the	host	state	explicitly	agree	to	provide	an	incentive?	Or	did	it	just	convince	the	foreign	investor	to	establish	in	that	new	strategic	sector?	A	restrictive	or	expansive	interpretation	of	these	bargains	can	have	major	legal	implications.	For	doctrines	like	acquired	rights,	vested	rights,	or	legitimate	expectations,	this	could	be	the	difference	between	a	decision	in	favor	of	the	foreign	investor,	or	of	the	host	state.	 		 For	investment	tribunals,	states	must	keep	their	promises	to	foreign	investors.	This	is	the	main	mission	of	the	international	investment	regime.	But	a	problem	of	fetishizing	pacta	sunt	servanda	is	that	this	disregards	the	indeterminate	nature	of	foreign	investor	rights.	These	rights	are	the	result	of	intense	negotiations	and	remain	subject	to	interpretation.	When	deciding	a	dispute,	arbitrators	inevitably	face	this	problem.	They	can	interpret	foreign	investor	rights	according	to	domestic	law,	or	fully	embrace	a	transactional	approach.	The	first	solution	implies	looking	for	answers	in	the	ground	rules	created	by	national	sovereigns,	which	could	be	more	favorable	to	a	plural	conception	of	property	and	disrupt	wealth	maximization.	The	second	approach	focuses	instead	on	facts	that	can	give	rise	to	state	representations	and	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations.93	Investment	arbitrators	follow	this	second	approach	when	they	apply	the	doctrine	of	legitimate	expectations	under	the	FET.	They	lean	on	a	reliance-based	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 		Human	Rights,’	International	Finance	Corporation	and	the	United	Nations	Special	Representative	to	the	Secretary	General	on	Business	and	Human	Rights	(2008).	92	L	Eden,	S	Lenway	&	D	Schuler,	‘From	the	obsolescing	bargain	to	the	political	bargaining	model,’	in	R.	Grosse	(ed.)	International	Business	and	Government	Relations	in	the	21st	
Century		(2005)	249,	255-6,	267-9.	93	Investment	tribunals	underline	the	importance	of	facts	in	the	context	of	the	FET.	See,	for	instance,	ICSID,	Spyridon	Roussalis	v.	Romania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/1,	7	December	2011,	Award,	¶	318;	NAFTA,	Merrill	v.	Canada,	UNCITRAL,	ICSID	Administered	Case	–	NAFTA,	31	March	2010,	Award,	¶	210;	ICSID,	Lemire	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/18,	14	January	2010,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction	and	Liability,	¶	284.	
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reasoning.	As	the	next	section	shows,	this	can	be	much	more	than	pacta	sunt	
servanda.	When	judges	enforce	a	bargain,	as	Llewellyn	notes,	it	is	difficult	to	discern	where	the	bargain	ends	and	where	judges	begin	intervening	in	the	legal	relationship.94			
B.	Extracting	foreign	investor	expectations	through	a	reliance-based	
reasoning	The	doctrine	of	legitimate	expectations	is	an	interpretative	formula	-	a	magic	formula	according	to	Gaillard.95	It	extracts	meaning	by	focusing	on	foreign	investor	reliance,	as	opposed	to	state	consent	or	the	legislation	of	the	host	country.	Arbitrators	claim	that	FET	and	the	MST	impose	on	them	the	application	of	this	formula	to	specify	the	scope	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Looking	at	the	sources	of	international	law,	however,	this	is	only	an	alternative.	There	are	sufficient	textual	and	historical	reasons	to	claim	the	contrary.	Previous	investment	awards	are	the	main	and	probably	only	source	for	the	protection	of	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations.96			 The	legitimate	expectations	doctrine	and	the	reliance	theory	have	been	influential	in	many	legal	systems	and	fields.	But	they	have	also	encountered	resistance.	Reliance	is	the	basis	of	contract	and	promissory	estoppel	in	private	law.97	Similarly,	it	is	the	justification	of	substantive	legitimate	expectations	in	administrative	law.	Some	administrative	law	scholars	who	favor	this	position,	like	Schønberg,	have	been	cited	approvingly	in	influential	investment	decisions.98	The	substantive	version	of	legitimate	expectations,	however,	is	resisted	in	many	jurisdictions,	including	the	United	Kingdom	and	France.99				 Essentially,	reliance	and	legitimate	expectations	serve	to	resolve	‘cases	whose	only	common	characteristic	[is]	the	absence	of	a	bargain.’100	This	
																																								 																				94	K	Llewellyn,	‘What	Price	Contract?-An	Essay	in	Perspective,’	40	Yale	Law	Review	(1931)	704,	731-4.	95	Gaillard,	‘Chronique	des	sentences	arbitrales	–	Centre	International	pour	le	Règlement	des	différends	Relatifs	aux	Investissements	(CIRDI),’	Revue	trimestrielle	Lexis	Nexis	Juris	
Classeur	(2008)	311,	332.	96	M	Paparinskis,	The	international	minimum	standard	and	fair	and	equitable	treatment	(Oxford	UP,	2013);	Suez	and	others	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/17,	30	July	2010,	Separate	Opinion	of	Pedro	Nikken,	¶¶	2-4,	12-25,	38-40.		97	See	Duncan	Kennedy,	‘From	the	Will	Theory	to	the	Principle	of	Private	Autonomy:	Lon	Fuller's"	Consideration	and	Form,’	100	Columbia	Law	Review	(2000)	94;	E	Bant	&	M	Bryan,	‘Fact,	Future	and	Fiction:	Risk	and	Reasonable	Reliance	in	Estoppel,’	35	Oxford	Journal	of	
Legal	Studies	(2015)	1.	98	Thunderbird	v.	Mexico,	UNCITRAL	(NAFTA),	1	December	2005,	Separate	Opinion	of	Thomas	Wälde,	¶	38.	See	S	Schønberg,	Legitimate	Expectations	in	Administrative	Law	(2000),	9-11.		99	C	Forsyth,	‘Legitimate	Expectations	Revisited,’	16	Judicial	Review	(2011)	429;	P	Reynolds,	‘Legitimate	Expectations	and	the	Protection	of	Trust	in	Public	Officials,’	Public	
Law	(2011)	330.	100	R	Barnett,	‘The	Death	of	Reliance,’	46	Journal	of	Legal	Education	(1996)	518,	524.	
Final	Draft	–	Forthcoming	in	the	Journal	of	International	Dispute	Settlement	
	 21	
does	not	mean	that	implicit	or	informal	representations	create	rights	or	privileges	because	of	state	intention.	According	to	the	reliance	theory,	what	creates	foreign	investor	rights	(and	the	correlative	duties)	is	foreign	investor	reliance	on	these	representations.	The	application	of	reliance	specifies	private	entitlements	focusing	on	the	expectations	of	the	promisee,	i.e.	the	foreign	investor,	instead	of	concentrating	on	the	intention	of	the	promisor,	i.e.	the	host	state.	Governments,	in	this	way,	can	create	legitimate	expectations	without	being	conscious	of	it.101		 The	application	of	the	legitimate	expectations	doctrine	opens	a	large	space	for	the	subjectivity	of	arbitrators.	‘[W]hen	people	have	different	expectations	they	are	apt	to	see	the	facts	differently.’102	In	the	context	of	large	investment	projects,	investment	arbitrators	face	numerous	facts	and	circumstances	that	can	give	rise	to	expectations	of	foreign	investors.	Tribunals	have	noted	on	several	occasions	that	the	resolution	of	a	dispute	depends	on	these	facts	and	circumstances,	but	which	are	relevant	and	how	much	they	matter	is	not	a	question	of	fact,	but	a	normative	issue.103	Thus,	for	instance,	should	investment	tribunals	pay	any	attention	to	state	development	plans,	as	Meier	proposed	in	the	1960s	or	Dolzer	suggested	in	the	1980s,	or	should	they	focus	on	the	rationality	of	private	investment	decisions?104				 Investment	tribunals	look	at	business	rationality.	A	reliance	approach	to	foreign	investor	rights	serves	to	expand	‘enforcement	beyond	the	requirement	of	a	bargain	by	identifying	an	additional	factor	or	factors	which	justify	enforcement.’105	For	most	arbitrators,	the	main	factor	is	that	foreign	investor	expectations	emerge	from	rational	business	calculations.	This	occurs,	for	instance,	when	a	foreign	investor	decides	to	establish	relying	on	explicit	or	implicit	state	representations.106	That	is	to	say	that	different	types	of	state	conduct,	e.g.	a	brochure	or	a	road	show,	could	in	principle	create	foreign	investor	rights.	As	the	tribunal	in	Electrabel	v.	Hungary	put	it,	in	addition,	an	‘assurance	is	not	always	indispensable.’107	
																																								 																				101	A	Gold,	‘A	Property	Theory	of	Contract,’	103	Northwestern	University	Law	Review	(2009),	22-3.		102	C	B	Macpherson,	‘The	Meaning	of	Property’,	in	C.	B.	Macpherson	(ed.)	Property,	
Mainstream	and	Critical	Positions	(University	of	Toronto	Press,	1978)	1,	1.			103	Koskenniemi,	supra	note	78,	16.	104	G	Meier,	‘Legal-Economic	Problems	of	Private	Foreign	Investment	in	Developing	Countries,’	33	University	of	Chicago	Law	Review	(1966)	463,	465;	R	Dolzer,	‘New	Foundations	of	the	Law	of	Expropriation	of	Alien	Property,’	75	American	Journal	of	
International	Law	(1981)	553,	585.	105	Barnett,	supra	note	100,	522.	106	Frontier	Petroleum	v.	the	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	12	November	2010,	Award,	¶	285;	
Parkerings-Compagniet	v.	Lithuania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/8,	11	September	2007,	Award,	¶	331;	Grand	River	v.	United	States,	UNCITRAL	–	NAFTA,	12	January	2011,	Award,	¶	141.	107	Electrabel	v.	Hungary,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/07/19,	30	November	2012,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	Applicable	Law	and	Liability,	¶	7.78.	
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	 Presently,	some	tribunals	have	adopted	a	more	restrictive	approach	to	the	issue	of	representations.	Recent	awards	are	stricter	when	it	comes	to	the	specificity	of	the	acts	that	can	serve	as	a	basis	for	legitimate	expectations.	State	representations	need	to	be	directed	at	the	foreign	investor.	Arbitrators,	however,	continue	to	extract	expectations	from	implicit	representations,	which	can	emerge	from	person-to-person	meetings	or	general	legislation.108				 To	be	protected,	in	addition,	foreign	investor	reliance	needs	to	be	relevant	to	the	specific	investment	project,	such	that	no	rational	foreign	investor	would	have	invested	without	being	assured	of,	for	instance,	the	possibility	of	expanding	the	business	project.109	This	does	not	mean	that	investment	treaties	constitute	‘insurance	policies	against	bad	business	judgments.’110	Investment	arbitrators	do	not	protect	subjective	expectations	of	profit.	They	only	protect	investment	decisions	that	result	in	profitable	projects.	It	can	be	argued,	in	this	regard,	that	the	economic	viability	of	the	project	is	a	fundamental	criterion	to	determine	whether	the	expectation	is	objective	and	legitimate.	Investment	tribunals	assess	whether	the	project	was	economically	viable	in	the	concrete	social,	political,	and	economic	context.111		 When	it	comes	to	specifying	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations,	in	short,	what	are	important	are	the	views	of	the	rational	foreign	investor,	and	not	the	views	of	the	host	state	or	local	actors.	Investment	arbitrators	apply	the	reliance	theory	in	a	one-sided	manner.	They	privilege	foreign	investor	trust	and	certainty,	but	at	the	expense	of	the	certainty	and	trust	of	locals	on	their	own	rights	and	institutions.112	This	carries	important	consequences	in	a	world	where	the	competition	to	attract	foreign	investment	shapes	state	attitudes.	States	take	measures	to	attract	foreign	investors,	but	this	may	not	be	because	they	want	to	be	bound	in	the	long	term.	They	may	be	trying	to	sell	their	location	as	any	market	actor	would	do.	This	is	what	a	neoliberal	development	policy	promotes,	and	it	is	not	very	different	from	what	foreign	investors	do.	They	try	to	convince	state	authorities	that	their	investment	projects	will	create	more	jobs	or	improve	living	standards.	Expectations,	in	other	words,	run	both	ways.	But	while	host	states	need	to	behave	according	to	foreign	investor	expectations,	foreign	investors	have	few	concerns	about	
																																								 																				108	Continental	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/9,	5	September	2008,	Award,	¶	261;	El	
Paso	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶¶	375-8.	109	Lemire	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/18,	14	January	2010,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction	and	Liability,	¶¶	265-71,	371	(and	dissent	of	Jürgen	Voss).	110	Maffezini	v.	Spain,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/97/7,	13	November	2000,	Award,	¶	64.	111	EDF	v.	Romania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/13,	8	October	2009,	Award,	¶	219;	Duke	v.	
Ecuador,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/04/19,	18	August	2008,	Award,	¶	340.	112	See	Reynolds,	supra	note	99,	340-1.	
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creating	the	promised	jobs	or	improving	living	standards	(Host	states	and	local	actors	cannot	enforce	these	promises).				4.	Foreign	investor	rights	and	local	expectations	When	applying	the	legitimate	expectations	doctrine,	the	arbitral	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	clashes	with	a	plural	understanding	of	property	and	a	will	theory	of	contracts.	Yet,	it	is	consistent	with	the	purpose	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Many	authors	criticize	reliance	because	freedom	of	contracts	requires	freedom	from	contracts.	From	a	libertarian	perspective,	the	argument	is	that	intention	should	be	the	only	source	of	obligations.113	From	a	progressive	standpoint,	the	claim	is	that	the	law	should	concern	itself	with	the	fairness	of	the	bargains.114	But	for	those	who	defend	the	use	of	legitimate	expectations	in	investment	arbitration,	reliance	is	necessary	to	meet	the	‘requirements	of	a	continuum	and	increased	international	flows	of	capital.’115	This	does	not	mean	that	arbitrators	are	unaware	of	the	doctrinal	problems	of	legitimate	expectations.	Investment	arbitrators	enforce	foreign	investor	legitimate	expectations	against	host	states	as	if	they	were	strong	property	rights,	but	refer	to	these	expectations	as	‘non-legally	binding’	or	‘less	than	rights.’116			 This	interpretative	outcome	represents	a	form	of	judicial	interventionism.	By	applying	reliance	in	a	one-sided	manner,	investment	tribunals	are	intervening	in	foreign	investment	relations	to	maximize	foreign	investor	reliance	on	host	state	representations.117	This	overlooks	that	maximizing	foreign	investor	reliance	comes	with	a	cost.	Strengthening	foreign	investor	rights	affects	host	state	sovereignty	and	the	rights	of	locals.	Given	that	foreign	investors	are	usually	sophisticated	business	actors,	the	protection	of	their	reliance	(and	not	the	reliance	of	local	actors)	requires	a	strong	justification.	From	a	progressive	view,	reliance	can	serve	to	protect	those	
																																								 																				113	R	Barnett,	‘The	Sound	of	Silence:	default	rules	and	contractual	consent,’	78	Virginia	Law	
Review	(1992)	828.	114	J	Singer,	No	Freedom	Without	Regulation:	The	Hidden	Lesson	of	the	Subprime	Crisis	(Yale	UP,	2015),	58-94.	115	Dolzer,	supra	note	104,	580.	116	El	Paso	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/15,	31	October	2011,	Award,	¶	376;	CMS	v.	
Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	25	September	2007,	Annulment	Decision,	¶	89;	Grand	
River	v.	U.S.A.,	UNCITRAL	–	NAFTA,	12	January	2011,	Award,	¶	140.	See	also	Mairal,	‘Legitimate	Expectations	and	Informal	Administrative	Representations,’	in	S.	Schill	(ed.)	
International	Investment	Law	and	Comparative	Public	Law	(2010)	422.	117	See	S	Smith,	Contract	Theory	(Oxford	UP,	2004)	44	(and	footnote	5).	Similarly,	C	Fried,	
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who	are	vulnerable,	but	this	argument	would	rarely	apply	in	the	case	of	MNCs.118		 In	international	investment	law,	the	justification	for	one-sided	reliance	is	that	foreign	investment	can	promote	economic	prosperity.	This	is	why	foreign	investment	should	not	‘depend	upon	the	subtleties	and	niceties’	of	host	governments	and	local	actors.119	But	this	interpretative	attitude	deals	in	a	formalistic	manner	with	two	central	issues.	First,	it	overlooks	the	distribution	of	the	benefits	and	costs	of	foreign	investment.	There	is	a	lot	at	stake	in	infrastructure,	extractive	and	other	large	economic	projects.	Secondly,	it	does	not	take	local	expectations	seriously.	The	emphasis	on	foreign	investment	as	a	means	to	maximize	wealth	is	only	legitimate	if	we	assume	the	validity	of	an	economic	view	of	individuals	and	communities.120	The	problem	with	this	interpretative	attitude,	which	dominates	investment	awards,	is	that	it	assumes	that	every	state	and	community	is	‘subject	to	an	obligatory	end,	namely,	the	pursuit	of	economic	rationality.’121			
Conclusions	In	this	article,	I	have	argued	that	investment	arbitrators	play	a	fundamental	role	in	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights.	When	tribunals	apply	the	FET,	they	specify	foreign	investor	rights	using	the	legitimate	expectations	doctrine	according	to	international	law.	Relying	on	property	theory,	I	have	contrasted	this	interpretation	against	wealth	maximization	and	propriety.	The	legal	reasoning	in	most	awards	promotes	the	calculations	of	foreign	investors	as	a	means	towards	economic	prosperity.	Foreign	investor	rights	and	their	calculations	serve	the	purpose	of	wealth	maximization.	This	leads	arbitrators	to	frame	foreign	investment	relations	in	transactional	terms,	where	the	interpretation	of	foreign	investment	bargains	plays	a	fundamental	role.			 In	this	transactional	view,	investment	tribunals	take	the	perspective	of	the	foreign	investor,	i.e.	a	global	absent	owner,	who	is	interested	in	carrying	out	specific	economic	activities,	earning	the	expected	profit,	and	moving	on	to	the	next	investment	opportunity.	The	problem	of	this	outcome	is	not	that	wealth	maximization	is	unimportant.	Some	economic	prosperity	is	necessary	for	maintaining	community.	It	is	rather	that	tribunals	overlook	
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that	foreign	investor	rights	are	also	about	local	preferences,	i.e.	propriety.	Local	actors	have	economic	as	well	as	non-economic	expectations	for	the	resources.	The	current	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights	often	disregards	these	local	preferences,	giving	rise	to	a	conception	of	property	that	can	be	described	as	a	global	right	to	investment.			 Investment	tribunals	could	interpret	foreign	investor	rights	differently.	There	is	nothing	in	the	treaties	against	a	more	plural	interpretation	of	these	rights.	To	start	with,	arbitrators	could	follow	those	who	claim	that	legitimate	expectations	should	play	no	role	in	investment	arbitration.	Today,	this	includes	the	United	States.	Unless	there	is	a	clear	contractual	commitment,	tribunals	could	rely	only	on	domestic	law	to	specify	foreign	investor	rights,	whether	in	the	form	of	acquired	rights,	vested	rights,	or	legitimate	expectations.	This	would	provide	more	certainty	to	states	and	local	actors	to	decide	the	terms	they	want	to	offer	foreign	investors,	promoting	as	much	freedom	of	contracts	as	from	contracts.	The	international	investment	regime	should	also	concern	itself	with	the	fairness	of	foreign	investment	bargains.	After	all,	an	offer	to	create	specific	property	entitlements,	like	a	license	to	produce	oil	or	gas,	is	a	very	serious	offer	that	governments	make	on	behalf	of	the	public.			
